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RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW - CORAM NOBIS - COUNSEL INTELLIGENTLY
WAIVED THOUGH INDICTMENT INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CHARGE
-NOT REVIEWABLE IN CORAM NOBIS AS ERROR OF LAW APPARENT
ON THE RECORD.- Defendant, after being informed of his rights,
waived counsel and pleaded guilty to a 'charge of first degree grand
larceny. The indictment, however, was defective in that it could only
have supported the charge in the second degree. In sustaining a writ
of error coram nobis the lower court found that the defendant did not
intelligently waive counsel since he was unaware of the indictment's
insufficiency. In reversing, the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, declared that it was wholly speculative whether assigned coun-
sel would have noticed the defect and held that since the defect was
an error of law appearing on the record it was not reviewable in
coram nobis. People v. Fortson, 7 App. Div. 2d 139, 180 N.Y.S.2d
945 (3d Dep't 1958).
The writ of error coram nobis was developed in 16th century
England. Prior to that time appellate review was limited exclu-
sively to examination of errors of law.' Coram nobis, literally "before
ourselves, ( ... i.e., in the king's or queen's bench.)," 2 was contrived
to permit the courts to take cognizance of errors in fact which were
not apparent on the record. 3 It enabled courts to vacate judgments
which might not have been rendered had the knowledge of certain
facts been before the trial court.4 In civil litigation, which first felt the
impact of the writ, it has been held available where the defendant
was underage,5 a married woman,6 or had died before judgment.7
As early as 1667 it was established that coram nobis would lie in
criminal cases as well.8 In the latter it has been invoked where a
plea of guilty has been induced by duress; 9 where perjured testi-
mony has been knowingly used by the prosecution; 1 or where the
defendant was insane at the time of the trial."
'FRANK, CORAm NoBIS 1.02 (1953).
2 BLACK, LAw DICTONARY 406 (4th ed. 1951).
3 See Orfield, Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice, 20 VA. L.
Rxv. 423, 424 (1934).
4 Donoghue & Jacobson, Coram Nobis and the Hoffiner Case, 28 ST. JOHN's
L. REv. 234, 235 (1954) ; Note, Current Treatment of Coram Nobis in Federal
and New York Courts, 33 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 98-99 (1958).
Higbie v. Comstock, 1 Denio 652 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1845); Meredith v.
Sanders, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 101, 102 (1810) (dictum); Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md.
130, 137 (1861) (dictum).6 Breckinridge v. Coleman, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 331 (1847); Latshaw v.
McNees, 50 Mo. 381 (1872); Roughton v. Brown, 53 N.C. 300 (1861).
7 Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364 (1853); f ills v. Alexander, 21 Tex. 154
(1858).
8 FRANK, CoRAm NoBIs 11.02 (1953). See also Freedman, The Writ of
Error Coram Nobis, 3 TEMP. L.Q. 365 (1929).
9 Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882).
20 Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88, 161 N.E. 375 (1928); People v. Steele, 65
N.Y.S.2d 214 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1946).
"Hydrick v. State, 104-Ark. 43, 148 S.W. 541 (1912); Howie v. State,
121 Miss. 197, 83 So. 158 (1919).
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Recovering from a state of virtual disuse into which it had fallen
during the 17th and 18th centuries,'1 2 the writ has undergone rapid
expansion and revitalization in recent decades.'3
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides
in part: "In all criminal lrosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, . . . and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." In Johnson v. Zerbst,'4 a habeas corpus
case, the United States Supreme Court declared that the right to
counsel is capable of being waived if it is done competently and in-
telligently. Whether there has been an intelligent waiver of counsel
must depend in each case "upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused." 15
In New York, the renaissance of coram nobis was accomplished
by the celebrated decision of Lyons v. Goldstein.' With the ruling
in that case veritable "floodgates of litigation" were opened, resulting
in a deluge of similar motions to vacate judgments. 7  New York,
however, has remained steadfast in its restriction of the applicability
of the writ.'8 While the New York courts have recognized the
efficacy of coram nobis in upholding the right of due process, 19 they
have, with but one exception, 20 been adamant in their refusal to
12 FRANK, CORAm NoBis ff 1.02, at 3 (1953) ; Donoghue & Jacobson, Coram
Nobis and the Hoffner Case, 28 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 234, 235 (1954).
13 Today much of the implementation of coram nobis has been in the field
of deprivation of constitutional privilege, particularly where the defendant con-
tends that his right to counsel has been abrogated. See, e.g., People v. Koch,
299 N.Y. 378, 87 N.E.2d 417 (1949); People ex rel. Sedlak v. Foster, 299
N.Y. 291, 86 N.E.2d 752 (1949).
14 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (dictum).
15 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ; see Bojinoff v. People, 299
N.Y. 145, 85 N.E.2d 145 (1949). See also People v. Boehm, 309 N.Y. 362,
130 N.E.2d 891 (1955) (dictum).
16 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943). The court held that the Court of
General Sessions has the power to grant the writ.
17 Donoghue & Jacobson, Coram Nobis and the Hoffner Case, 28 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 234, 238 (1954).
18 See People v. Caminito, 3 N.Y.2d 596, 601, 148 N.E.2d 139, 143, 170
N.Y.S.2d 799, 804 (1958). The court declared that while the scope of coram
nobis has been somewhat expanded beyond its original office, it still remains
an emergency measure employed for the purpose for which it was initially
designed, that of calling up facts unknown at the time of judgment.
19 People v. Koch, 299 N.Y. 378, 87 N.E.2d 417 (1949); People ex rel.
Sedlak v. Foster, 299 N.Y. 291, 86 N.E.2d 752 (1949).
20 People v. Silverman, 3 N.Y.2d 200, 144 N.E.2d 10, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11
(1957). In ordering the trial court to grant a hearing where the trial court
had improperly assigned counsel and refused to grant counsel of defendant's
own choosing adequate time to prepare the defense, the court stated that
"although the fundamental precept of coram nobis is that it may not be em-
ployed to raise errors appearing on the face of the record, there is an excep-
tion to this basic rule. Judicial interference with the right to counsel guaranteed
... by law may warrant the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis, even though
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vacate judgments where the error complained of was one of law
apparent on the record. 2
1
In the present case the Court states that even though the defen-
dant was ignorant of the indictment's insufficiency it does not follow
that he did not intelligently waive his right to counsel. The Court
reasoned that since the prosecution and the lower court failed to
notice the defect in the indictment, it must remain wholly in the field
of speculation as to whether assigned counsel would have done so.22
Nevertheless, even if such a presumption could be made in the de-
fendant's favor relief could not be granted in this proceeding since
the error was one of law apparent on the record.
While at first glance the decision may seem harsh, other rem-
edies are available to the defendant. 23 The writ of error coram nobis
was intended to provide a means of relief where formerly none had
existed, i.e., to relieve against errors of fact unknown at the trial.
It is applicable only where no other remedy is available.2 4
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to prescribe the exact limits
of coram nobis. However, in determining whether the remedy may
be invoked, it is well to remember the history and purpose of the
writ lest it become merely a substitute for appeal and other available
remedies.
EMINENT DOMAIN-ESTABLISHMENT OF Bus STOPS BY CITY
HELD NOT A COMPENSABLE TAKING OF ABUTTING OWNER'S RIGHT
OF AccEss.-Plaintiffs, gas station owners, sought to enjoin the City
of New York from establishing bus stops, terminals, and turn-around
points fronting on their driveways, and asked damages for this al-
legedly serious impairment of their easements of access. The Court
the error appears on the face of the record... ." Id. at 202, 144 N.E.2d at
11, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
21 People v. Johnson, 10 Misc. 2d 103, 172 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Dutchess County
Ct. 1958); People v. Waterman, 5 App. Div. 2d 717, 168 N.Y.S.2d 819 (3d
Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision) (dictum); People v. Langford, 4 App.
Div. 2d 919, 166 N.Y.S.2d 933 (3d Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision)(dictum).22 It would appear that the court presumes a doefense counsel may very
well be negligent. But cf. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E.
88 (1926).
23 Errors of law committed by a lower court are subject to attack by a
motion for a new trial, an appeal or other statutory remedy for which coram
nobis is not a substitute. See Taylor v. United States, 177 F.2d 194 (4th Cir.
1949); People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 232 Pac. 457, 460 (1924).
24 FRANx, CoRAm NoBis 3.02 (1953) ; Note, Ci rrent Treatment of Coram
Nobis in Federal and New York Courts, 33 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 98, 105 (1958).
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